State Responsibility



Author: Prof.Walter Arévalo-Ramírez PhD,[1] (with undergraduate Collaborators: Valeria Hernández – Valeria Maldonado U.Rosario (Colombia). Editing and research assistants)

Required knowledge: Sources of International Law, Subjects of International Law.

'Learning objectives: Understand the regime of state responsibility and the steps to establish the consequences of an international wrongful act.

A. Historic introductionEdit

Since the first half of the 20th century, there has been a growing interest in the development and codification of the principles of international state responsibility. The issue was discussed at the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, but the participating States were unable to reach an agreement on the issue. Later, when in 1948 the UN General Assembly established the ILC, the issue of State responsibility was chosen as one of the first topics to be dealt with by the ILC.[2]

Starting in 1956, the ILC focused the efforts on developing a series of articles on international State responsibility, taking as reference pre-existing international case-law, State practice, and doctrine. Finally, in 2001 the ILC approved the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and submitted the text to the UN General Assembly for consideration. On December 12, 2001, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. AG / 56/83, taking note of the Project and bringing it to the attention of the governments.[3] Today, there is no agreement on the need of negotiating an international convention on international responsibility of States that translates into conventional instrument the customary norms contained in the Project.

Despite the lack of consensus for the adoption of an international convention that reflects the content of the Project[4] the norms and principles of international responsibility are frequently applied by international tribunals and courts. Indeed, it is indisputable that several of the articles of the Project reflect international custom, while others are considered as progressive development of Public International Law.[5]

B. The concept of “international wrongful act”Edit

I. the notion of “objective responsibility” in international law

Article 1 of the Draft Articles establishes the general principle of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and its elements. The first of these elements is the direct relationship between the wrongful act and international responsibility. This relationship, known as the Principle of Responsibility, means that whenever there is an internationally wrongful act attributable to a State, there will be international responsibility. This direct relationship between international wrongful act and international responsibility has been classified as a form of objective responsibility in public international law, since it is not mediated by the verification of elements such as negligence, guilt or other elements of subjective responsibility, or other requirements of liability regimes related to domestic law.[6]

Secondly, international State responsibility is the set of new legal relationships and obligations that emerge between subjects of international law once an internationally wrongful act is attributed to a State.[7]

The particular content of these possible new obligations consists of the consequences of the wrongful act and varies from case to case. For example, there may be cases where there is international responsibility but there is no damage, since the only thing required for the establishment of responsibility is the breach of an international obligation, as well as there may be cases where there is damage and one or more forms of reparation.


II. Elements of an international wrongful act.

An internationally wrongful act is defined by Article 2 of the Draft Articles as a conduct consisting of an act or omission that meets two requirements: (i) it is attributable to a State and (ii) it constitutes a breach of a binding international obligation of a State at that time.

The concept of "act" not only covers acts and omissions but was also chosen by the ILC so as not to introduce into the regime of international responsibility concepts such as international "crime" or "offence", which could be confused with concepts of domestic law or international criminal law.

C. Attribution of international wrongful actsEdit

Attribution of conduct to a State implies a legal exercise whereby the conduct of an organ, a person or a group of persons is imputed to the State, in accordance with criteria determined by PIL. Thus, the attribution of conducts to a State implies that, by virtue of certain criteria established by PIL, the State will be considered as the author of an act committed by an organ, a person or a group of persons and the legal consequences of the act will fall on the State, without prejudice to the legal consequences that may also fall on the material author of the act or fact emanating from other regimes.

I. Criteria of attribution adopted by the ILC.

In principle, the State is responsible only for the wrongful acts of its organs and agents. Except in the cases expressly provided for, the acts of private persons are not attributable to the State under international law. However, not every conduct of organs and agents of the State is imputable to the State. Moreover, in exceptional situations the State may be held responsible for acts of private persons. PIL provides for several cases in which the conduct of certain individuals and organs is considered attributable to the State, as explained below.

1. Conduct of organs and agents of a State

Article 4 of the Draft Articles provides that the conduct of any State organ, whatever its position or function within the State, is considered an act of the State. In that sense, the concept of organ extends to any State entity, whether it exercises executive, legislative, judicial, or even commercial functions, at the central, regional, local or even federal government level.

The domestic law of the State plays a fundamental role in establishing whether a given entity constitutes a State organ for the purposes of the State's international responsibility. However, the exercise of attribution of conduct to a State goes beyond what is established by domestic law, so the conduct of institutions exercising public functions is attributable to the State in cases of exercise of public authority, even if under domestic law such institutions are considered independent or autonomous bodies or enjoy separate legal personality from the State.

According to Article 5 of the Draft Articles, the conduct of any person or entity empowered by domestic law of a State to exercise public functions is attributed to the State, as long as the person or entity acts in that capacity. This is a functional criterion since it refers to the function exercised by the individual or entity, regardless of whether it is structurally considered an organ of the State or not. Therefore, the State may be held liable for the wrongful conduct of parastatal entities or public, semi-public or even private companies provided that (i) they are empowered by domestic law to exercise certain public or regulatory functions and (ii) the act is related to the exercise of the assigned public or regulatory function, even if under administrative law they are not considered part of the State structure.[8]

Article 6 of the Draft Articles provides that the conduct of an organ of a State in the service of a second State with its consent and acting under its authority and control shall be attributable to the receiving State, as long as the organ is acting in the exercise of public functions of the State at whose disposal it is placed. For example, the Privy Council, a body of advisors to the British monarch, has occasionally acted as a judicial body of last resort at the disposal of several Commonwealth States. In such cases, the decisions of the Privy Council are attributable to the receiving State and not to the United Kingdom, from which the Privy Council originates.

In any of the cases envisaged above, the conduct will be equally attributable to the State even if the person, organ or entity has exceeded its competence or contravened its instructions or the domestic law of the State. Thus, Article 7 of the Draft Articles provides that to the extent that the organ, person or entity has acted in its official capacity, the State may not invoke the alleged violation of its instructions or the improper, illegitimate or excessive exercise of public functions as circumstances for interrupting the link of attribution of the conduct to a State. However, if the conduct of the organ, person or entity is totally outside its official functions, i.e., ultra vires, such conduct will not be attributable to the State.

2. Conduct of de facto organs of a State

Article 8 of the Draft Articles provides for a control criterion according to which the conduct of a person or group of persons acting on the instructions or under the direction or control of the State is a de facto organ of a State. Their behavior is considered attributable to the State even though from an administrative point of view it is not an organ within its official structure.

For example, in the case of an armed conflict, the internationally wrongful act of a paramilitary group fighting against government armed forces may give rise to the international responsibility of a third State if the group acts under its control. [9]Similarly, the semi-public or even private companies may be attributable to the State when they act on the instructions or under the control of the State. The mere ownership of an enterprise by the State does not necessarily imply that the acts of the enterprise are attributable to the State, except in cases where the enterprise has exercised public powers, in accordance with Article 5 of the Draft Articles.

Article 9 of the Draft provides for the case in which, exceptionally, due to a revolution, armed conflict or foreign occupation, the regular state organs are absent or prevented from acting. In such a case, the conduct of persons or groups of persons exercising public functions shall be attributable to the State.[10]

Article 10 of the Draft Articles provides that if an insurrectional movement succeeds in becoming the new government of a State, its conduct shall be attributable to that State. Furthermore, should the insurrectional movement succeed in establishing a new State, its conduct shall be attributable to the new State. If the insurrectional movement fails in taking over the government of the State or in creating a new State, its acts shall not be attributable to the State, without prejudice to other criteria of attribution under the Draft Articles, for instance, if the insurrectional movement acts under the control of a third State under Article 8 of the Draft Articles.

Article 11 of the Draft provides for a residual criterion, according to which the conduct of a person or entity that is explicitly or implicitly recognized and adopted by the State as its own shall be attributable to the State, even if none of the above-mentioned criteria of attribution is met. Therefore, the attribution of the conduct to the State will be ex post facto, i.e., it will be determined by a subsequent act of the State recognizing or adopting such conduct as its own.

3. Responsibility of a State in connection with the act of another State.

In principle, each State is responsible for any act or omission attributable to it in accordance with the rules of attribution set out above and constituting a breach of an international obligation of the State. Nonetheless, the Draft Articles provides for three exceptional situations in which a State is held vicariously responsible for an internationally wrongful act committed by another State, without prejudice to the international responsibility of the State committing the wrongful act.

First, Article 16 of the Draft Articles provides that a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is internationally responsible to the extent that it has contributed to the commission of the wrongful act, provided that (i) the State has knowledge that its aid or assistance will contribute to the commission of an internationally wrongful act, (ii) the aid or assistance is given with the intent to facilitate the commission of the wrongful act, and (iii) the assisting State is also bound by the obligation breached, so that the conduct of the assisted State would have been equally wrongful had it been committed directly by the assisting State.

Secondly, under Article 17 of the Draft, a State directing and controlling another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is internationally responsible, provided that (i) the controlling State has knowledge of the wrongful character of the acts, and (ii) the controlling State is also bound by the obligation breached. For example, in case of military occupation where the organs of the occupied State act under the direction and control of the occupying State, the occupying State is vicariously liable, without prejudice to the direct responsibility of the occupied State.

Finally, Article 18 provides for the responsibility of a State which coerces another State to commit an internationally wrongful act, that is, which exercises force or violence against another State in order to cause the coerced State to breach an international obligation towards a third State. The coercing State shall be held solely responsible towards the third State provided that it acted with knowledge of the circumstances of the wrongful act and that, but for the coercion, the act would have constituted an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State.

D. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness.Edit

The regime of international responsibility of the State recognizes six circumstances precluding wrongfulness, as occurs in different regimes of legal responsibility at the domestic law level, which recognize certain circumstances in which the breach of an obligation is excused and some of the consequences of such breach are avoided.

The circumstances precluding wrongfulness are of general application, i.e., they apply to obligations arising from any source of PIL, such as treaties, custom, unilateral acts, among others.

Secondly, the circumstances precluding wrongfulness under PIL only exclude the wrongfulness of the act but are not exemptions from responsibility. This implies that they do not exempt the State from the obligation to repair the damages caused by the conduct that would have been unlawful if the circumstances precluding wrongfulness had not arisen, nor do they destroy the existence and continuity of the international obligation, to which the State covered by the cause must return as soon as possible.

I. Criteria and circumstances recognized by the ILC.

1. Consent

Article 20 of the Draft Articles provides that a State may obtain the consent of another State to conduct which, in the absence of such permission, would constitute a wrongful act in breach of an international obligation binding upon them. In order to be valid, consent must be given by State authorities who are in a position to represent the State and bind it internationally.

Consent is not required to be given through an instrument as the one where the principal obligation arises, such as a treaty, and may extend both before and during the occurrence of the allegedly wrongful conduct. The limits of the consent granted by the State must be respected. Otherwise, independent wrongful acts will be established. For example, in the case of a permit to cross the airspace to attend to a specific situation, if unauthorized overflights were to take place subsequently, each of these would constitute an autonomous wrongful act.

2. self-defense.

Pursuant Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, States have the inherent right to self-defense.[11] Article 21 of the Draft Articles provides the exclusion of wrongfulness if a State breaches its international obligations in the exercise of an act of self-defense, whether against the State from which it is repelling an attack, or against third States.[12]

Self-defense as a circumstances precluding wrongfulness has certain limits.[13] On the one hand, for the circumstance to be valid, both with respect to the attacking State and with respect to third States, the State invoking it must comply with all the substantive and procedural elements described in the UN Charter on self-defense and the general prohibition of the use of force, for example, temporality, proportionality, and participation of the Security Council. Likewise, acts carried out in the context of self-defense must respect international humanitarian law.[14]

3. Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act.

Countermeasures are reactive actions against a State's wrongful conduct, which seek to compel it to return to compliance with a breached obligation. They consist of measures that seek to have a sufficient effect on the State that has breached an obligation, so that it ceases its non-compliance. In the choice of these measures, obligations in force between the two States in question may be breached. As such, they have been described as legal reprisals or misnamed "sanctions" in some proceedings.

However, Article 22 of the Draft Articles recognizes countermeasures as circumstances for exclusion of wrongfulness, if they meet the requirements of PIL for countermeasures as actions seeking the cessation of another State's breach. Therefore, by making the measure a lawful countermeasure, the wrongfulness of the act is excluded as long as it complies with some elements established by jurisprudence and doctrine, such as the need to be proportional, temporary and to be lifted once the breach has ceased, that they do not constitute measures of armed force and that they are reversible in nature.[15]

4. Force Majeure.

The classic circumstance precluding wrongfulness by force majeure is characterized especially by the presence of an invincible, uncontrollable, and involuntary element that compels the State to perform a conduct that is contrary to what is required of it by an international obligation.

Article 23 of the Draft Articles, by recognizing an "irresistible force" or an "unforeseen event" beyond the control of the State as circumstances of force majeure, accepts that both natural and man-made causes may constitute circumstances of force majeure, such as an avalanche, an earthquake, or an armed attack on a portion of the territory.

These circumstances, apart from being unforeseeable (or difficult to foresee or avoid) must create a situation where it is materially impossible to perform an international obligation, and not only make its performance more difficult.[16]

A circumstance where the State invoking it has directly contributed to the existence of the circumstance will not be admissible as force majeure. Nor does it exempt from the damage generated by the action, it only exempts from its wrongfulness, such as the damage caused by the ships of a State that are dragged to a foreign port by an irresistible storm.

5. Distress.

In the case of distress, Article 24 of the Draft Articles recognizes the voluntary and conscious action of an individual attributable to a State who decides to take a measure contrary to an obligation of PIL to save his life or that of others in a situation of maximum danger and urgency. The circumstance has been mostly invoked in cases of ships and aircrafts that in the face of mechanical failures or meteorological threats enter the territory of another State without permission seeking shelter from the weather or other emergencies that threaten the loss of the ship and the lives on board.

The circumstance of Distress cannot be invoked if the measure taken to safeguard the lives of the persons on board generates a greater danger. Likewise, the circumstance of distress is invalidated if the situation of distress is the result of the negligence of the State, such as the lack of aircraft maintenance.

6. Necessity.

Article 25 of the Draft Articles provides that necessity may not be invoked unless the act from which wrongfulness is sought to be excluded (i) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril and (ii) does not seriously affect an essential interest of another State. This is the only circumstance identified by the ILC that begins with a prohibition on its invocation. This is due to the delicate legal and political consequences of the indeterminacy of the concept "essential interest of the State" at the heart of the circumstance, as a reason of State interest that justifies it to breach international obligations.

The above examples demonstrate the difficulty of establishing what is a valid essential interest. In the case of a recent economic crisis in Argentina, resolving the claims of different foreign investors against the State, some arbitral tribunals admitted and at the same time others rejected that Argentina invoked that an essential interest of the State was its economic stability and, based on it, took measures that violated a series of obligations regarding the protection of foreign investment in the face of a very serious economic and financial crisis.[17]

In view of this difficulty, the circumstance recognized in Article 25 of the Draft Article is initially considered as prohibited, unless the measure is the only one possible to "safeguard an essential interest" from a grave and imminent danger.

E. Invocation of State responsibilityEdit

The international responsibility of a State arises when the conditions analyzed above are met, independently of the conduct of the injured State or any other State. However, to give effect to such responsibility, it must be invoked by the injured State or another subject of PIL entitled to that effect. The invocation of a breach, depending if the obligation emanates, for example, from bilateral or multilateral obligation, and the “standing” of different States, is described in article 42 of the Draft Articles, giving the right to invoke responsibility to the affected State.

The international responsibility of the State produces a series of legal consequences, including the obligation of the responsible State to make reparation for the damage caused. Below we will explain the ways of invoking the international responsibility of the State and its consequences.

  • Article 42: Invocation of responsibility by an injured State A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to: (a) That State individually; or (b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation: (i) Specially affects that State; or (ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.

F. Consequences of State responsibilityEdit

Article 28 of the Draft Articles reflects the general principle that internationally wrongful act produces legal consequences. The responsible State will be subject to several obligations provided for in the Draft Articles, without prejudice to the legal consequences provided for under other regimes, e.g., in case of a serious breach of a Treaty, the injured State will be entitled to terminate or suspend the Treaty.

The main legal consequence is the obligation of the responsible State to make full reparation for the damage caused by the wrongful act, as will be explained in the next section.

Furthermore, Article 30 of the Draft provides two additional obligations of the responsible State:

First, the responsible State must cease its wrongful conduct. The obligation to cease the wrongful conduct will arise only if the wrongful act is of a continuing or composite nature and the breached norm remains in force despite its violation by the responsible State. Second, the responsible State may be obliged to provide adequate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of its wrongful conduct when this is deemed necessary for the purpose of restoring confidence between the parties and preventing future violations. Unlike the obligations to make reparation and to cease the wrongful conduct, the obligation to provide assurances of non-repetition will arise only in exceptional situations considering the rank of the obligation breached, the gravity of the breach and the risk that the responsible State will again incur in the breach of the obligation.[18]

The flagrant or systematic violation of a norm of ius cogens, for instance in case of genocide or torture, will arise obligations for international community as a whole[19], without prejudice to the specific obligations of reparation, cessation and provision of guarantees of non-repetition imposed on the responsible State. Article 41 of the Draft Articles provides for the obligation of all States (i) to cooperate in order to put an end to the violation, either within the framework of the UN or through any other lawful means.[20] (ii) not to recognize as lawful situations resulting from the violation, and (iii) not to give aid or assistance to the responsible State to maintain the situation of non-compliance.

G. ReparationsEdit

If the international responsibility of the State is established, apart from the continuity of the obligation, cessation, non-repetition, and the possibility of sanctions according to the applicable primary norm, Articles 31 and 34 of the ILC Draft provide for the State to make full reparation for the damages caused by its wrongful act, including both material and moral damages and interest.

In PIL, international tribunals, such as the , PCIJ, PCA, the ICJ or the IACHR, have reiterated that reparation of the damage is carried out under the principle of restitutio in integrum or integral reparation of the damage, enunciated by the ICJC in the case of the Chorzów Factory.[21] According to this principle, the possibility that the reparation exceeds the damage and may have punitive, sanctioning or preventive functions, as occurs with the torts regime in common law, is excluded.[22]

The forms of reparation admitted in matters of international responsibility are (i) restitution, (ii) compensation and (iii) satisfaction, which may be given in a single or combined form. Some specific treaties and particular jurisdictions, for example, regional human rights systems [23]may require that the forms of reparation be given concomitantly in the face of serious human rights violations in order to achieve, in the specific case, true restitutio in integrum.[24]

I. Forms of reparation recognized by the ILC.

1. Restitution.

The first measure of reparation to be adopted by the breaching, responsible State, enshrined in Article 25 of the Draft Articles, is restitution, understood as the reestablishment of the previous situation or status quo ante, that is, the return to the situation as it was before the internationally wrongful act happened. The basis of restitution is the effort to be made by the State that commits a wrongful act to erase the consequences of its behavior and to try to bring the injured State to a situation as close and materially as possible to the moment prior to the wrongful behavior. Usually, it takes the form of a material conduct such as the release of persons illegally detained, the return of property, the reversal of a judicial decision[25] or a legal norm that violates an international obligation, the withdrawal of troops, etc. Restitution as a path within reparation is not indispensable in cases where it is materially impossible to return to previous circumstances.

2. Compensation.

If restitution is not possible, Article 36 provides compensation as other way of redressing an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act. Compensation corresponds to the payment of any damage that is susceptible of financial assessment, including loss of profits insofar as proven.[26] International jurisprudence has repeatedly held that a court that has jurisdiction to declare the international responsibility for a wrongful act has jurisdiction to produce a judgment fixing the amount of compensation or indemnification, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The practice of the tribunals has not only recognized compensation to pay for damages caused to the property of a State,[27] but has also recognized compensation for environmental damage[28] violations of investment regimes, loss of profits and injuries to individuals. Regularly, the value of compensation corresponds to an average of the market cost of the affected assets, taking into account whether the damage is total or partial. Likewise, loss of profit has generally been predicated on assets whose nature is the production of wealth, such as industries, infrastructure works, merchant ships, investments, etc. It has also been recognized that some incidental measures taken by the affected State to mitigate the damage may be subject to compensation.[29]

3. Satisfaction.

Exceptionally, Article 37 of the Draft Articles provides that when some type of damage with special characteristics has not been repaired through restitution or is not susceptible of financial evaluation, the responsible State must resort to satisfaction to achieve full reparation of the damage caused.

Satisfaction responds directly to the moral damages not susceptible of financial evaluation that the affected party may suffer, which according to the literature have been called in some cases affronts or offenses to the State or to other subjects, damages of a symbolic nature. These damages may or may not derive from damages that are susceptible to financial assessment, for example, the attack on a flagship warship and property of the State, may in turn be considered an offense to a national symbol, not only the material damage to a vessel. They may also arise from affronts to national symbols such as the flag, invasion of territory or mistreatment of the head of state.

Among the forms of satisfaction in international responsibility of the State are the express acknowledgment of the act, public apologies, diplomatic notes, reestablishment of diplomatic relations and expressions of regret by the Head of State. In more particular scenarios, more complex forms of satisfaction have been developed to repair wrongful acts relating to serious human rights violations[30] such as the experience of the IACHR[31] which has ordered the construction of monuments[32] the installation of plaques in public places, the publication of sentences or personal apologies by an agent of the State to those directly affected. For example, the IACHR has ordered the creation of memorials, plaques, street names, national days, and other measures of satisfaction in the Molina Theissen case, 19 Merchants case, Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers case, Plan de Sánchez Massacre case, Huilca Tecse case, Moiwana Community case, Mapiripán Massacre case, and many others within its varied jurisprudence on reparations.

Further ReadingsEdit

  • Michael Feit, “Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity”. Berkeley Journal of International Law 28, nº 1 (2010)
  • Shelton, Dinah. "Righting wrongs: reparations in the articles on state responsibility." American Journal of International Law96.4 (2002): 833-856.
  • Arevalo Ramirez, Walter; Rousset, Andrés. “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).” In Oxford Bibliographies in International Law. Ed. Tony Carty. New York: Oxford University Press. (2021)

Table of ContentsEdit

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Part I - History, Theory, and Methods

Part II - General International Law

Part III - Specialized Fields

FootnotesEdit

  1. Principal Professor of Public International Law. Universidad del Rosario. Colombia.
  2. James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Part I.
  3. United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. AG / 56/83, December 12, 2001.
  4. For example, the obligation of the responsible State to fully repair the damage caused by its illegal behavior.
  5. For example, the obligation of the responsible State to offer security and adequate guarantees of non-repetition.
  6. James Crawford, The International Law Commission's articles on state responsibility: introduction, text and commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 77.
  7. James Crawford, "The ILC’s articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts: a retrospect". American Journal of International Law 96, nº 4 (2002): 874-890.
  8. Michael Feit, “Responsibility of the State under International Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity”. Berkeley Journal of International Law 28, nº 1 (2010)
  9. Holker, Veronika. Arévalo-Ramírez, Walter. "La responsabilidad internacional y la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz en Colombia frente a la Corte Penal Internacional" In Gobernanza global y responsabilidad internacional del Estado Experiencias en América Latina. Universidad El Bosque; pp. 165-180 (2019).
  10. Bonilla-Matiz, Tania, Arévalo-Ramírez, Walter. Responsabilidad internacional del Estado por hechos internacionalmente ilícitos, obligaciones internacionales emanadas del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos y procesos de justicia transicional: entre el cumplimiento y la colisión. In. Carlos Mauricio, López-Cárdenas. Reflexiones sobre el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Universidad del Rosario, (2020).
  11. United Nations Charter, entered into force October 24, 1945, article 2.4.
  12. Walter Arévalo, "Responsabilidad Internacional del Estado por Hechos Internacionalmente ilícitos: Las causales de exclusión de ilicitud, su contenido y escenarios de aplicación", in Derecho internacional: varias visiones un maestro Liber amicorum en Homenaje a Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Edited by Ricardo Abello-Galvis (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2015)
  13. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, "Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility: Self-Defence", en The law of International Responsibility Edited by James Crawford, Alain Pellet y Simon Olleson,(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010): 455-467.
  14. See Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, 1996.
  15. Thomas M. Franck, "On proportionality of countermeasures in international law". American Journal of International Law 102, nº 4 (2008): 715-767.
  16. Crawford, The International Law Commission's articles on state responsibility.
  17. Walter Arévalo y Laura García, "El estado de necesidad en el arbitraje de inversión: su invocación consuetudinaria y convencional en los arbitrajes Enron, Sempra, CMS, LG&E y Continental ante el Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias relativas a Inversiones (CIADI)". Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 17 (2017): 469-512.
  18. Abello-Galvis, Ricardo. "Introducción al estudio de las normas de ius cogens en el seno de la comisión de derecho internacional, CDI." Vniversitas Magazine. Bogotá (Colombia), No. 123, (julio-diciembre de 2011); pp. 75-104 (2011).
  19. Abello-Galvis, Ricardo. "Introducción al estudio de las normas de ius cogens en el seno de la comisión de derecho internacional, CDI." Vniversitas Magazine. Bogotá (Colombia), No. 123, (julio-diciembre de 2011); pp. 75-104 (2011).
  20. Núñez, Andrés Téllez. "Aproximación multidimensional al régimen de responsabilidad internacional y al principio de no intervención. El problema hermenéutico." ACDI-Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional 13 (2020): 2.
  21. Case Chorzów Factory, ICJ
  22. García-Matamoros, Laura Victoria, Arévalo-Ramírez, Walter. "Desarrollos recientes sobre daños punitivos en el derecho continental, en el common law, en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos y en el derecho internacional (Recent Developments in Punitive Damages in Civil Law, Common Law, the Interamerican Human Rights System and International Law)." Revista de Derecho Privado 37 (2019).
  23. Mac-Gregor, Eduardo Ferrer. "Conventionality control the new doctrine of the inter-american court of human rights." AJIL Unbound 109 (2015): 93-99.
  24. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, IACHR, Merits, 1988: ¶¶ 25 y ss.
  25. Arévalo-Ramírez, Walter. "Resistance to territorial and maritime delimitation judgments of the International Court of Justice and clashes with ‘territory clauses’ in the Constitutions of Latin American states." Leiden Journal of International Law (2021): 1-24.
  26. See Chorzów Factory Case and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ.
  27. Corfu Channel Case, ICJ
  28. Shelton, Dinah. "Righting wrongs: reparations in the articles on state responsibility." American Journal of International Law96.4 (2002): 833-856.
  29. Cantor, Ernesto Rey, Rey Anaya, Ángela Margarita. Medidas provisionales y medidas cautelares en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Temis, 2005.
  30. López, Juana Inés Acosta, Amaya Villarreal, Álvaro Francisco. "La responsabilidad internacional del Estado frente al deber de custodia: estándares internacionales frente a los centros estatales de detención." Estudios Socio-Jurídicos 13.2 (2011): 301-326.
  31. Abello-Galvis, Ricardo., Arévalo-Ramírez, Walter. La recepción y desarrollo jurisprudencial de la responsabilidad internacional del Estado por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en materia de los criterios de atribución de conductas al Estado: el hecho ilícito en el tiempo y las formas de reparación integral. In. Abello-Galvis, R., Arévalo-Ramírez, W., Olasolo, H., & Mejía, A. V. (Eds.). (2020). Diálogos y casos iberoamericanos sobre derecho internacional penal, derecho internacional humanitario y justicia transicional. Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
  32. Arevalo Ramirez, Walter; Rousset, Andrés. “Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).” In Oxford Bibliographies in International Law. Ed. Tony Carty. New York: Oxford University Press. (2021)