User:ShayMTR/sandbox/Epistemology/References and further reading
Section 1: The Analysis of Knowledge
editIchikawa, J. J. & Steup, M. (2018). The Analysis of Knowledge (Summer 2018 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Conceptual analysis
editBeaney, M. (2018). Analysis (Summer 2018 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Chapter 10: "Postwar Oxford Philosophy (1958)" in Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 171-180.
Margolis, E. & Stephen L. (2021). Concepts (Spring 2021 Edition) §2. The structure of concepts. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Justified true belief
editPlato, Burnyeat, M. (trans.) & Levett, M. J. (trans.) (1997). Theaetetus. In Cooper, J. (ed.) Plato: Complete Works. Hackett. pp.157-234.
Plato, Grube, G. M. A. (trans.) (1997). Meno. In Cooper, J. (ed.) Plato: Complete Works. Hackett. pp. 870-897.
Radford, C. (1966). Knowledge: By Examples. Analysis 27 (1):1.
Gettier cases
editGettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Russell, B. (2009). Chapter 11: "Fact, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge" in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Routledge. pp. 130-142.
Weatherson, B. (2003). What good are counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
No false lemmas and sensitivity to truth
editClark, M. (1963). Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper. Analysis 24 (2):46-48.
Goldman, A. I. (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Kripke, S. (2011). Chapter 7: "Nozick on Knowledge" in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 162-224
Nozick, R. (1981). Chapter 3 §1: "Knowledge" in Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press. pp. 172-196.
Rabinowitz, D. (2011). The Safety Condition for Knowledge. In Fieser, J. & Dowden, B. (eds.) The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Shope, R. K. (2017). Chapter 3: "Additions to Standard Analyses II: Limitations on the Presence of Falsehoods in Justification" in The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton University Press. pp. 81-95.
Reliabilism
editVirtue epistemology
editBattaly, H. (2008). Virtue epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Greco, J. & Reibsamen, J. (2018). Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology. In Snow, N. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 725-746.
Millar, A. (2010). Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities. In Pritchard, D., Millar, A. & Haddock, A. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-143.
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford University Press.
Turri, J., Mark A. & Greco, J. (2019). Virtue Epistemology (Fall 2019 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Wright, S. (2018). Virtue Responsibilism. In Snow, N. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 747-764.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (1999). "What Is Knowledge?". In Greco, J. & Sosa, E. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 92-116.
Unanalysable knowledge
editSection 2: The Sources of Knowledge
editMarkie, P. (2017). Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Fall 2017 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Steup, M. & Neta, R. (2020). Epistemology (Fall 2020 Edition) §5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification. In Zalta, E. N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Perception
editCrane, T. & French, C. (2021). The Problem of Perception (Spring 2021 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.
Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Innatism
editLeibniz, G. W. (1996). Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding (2nd ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) (P. Remnant & J. Bennett, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2004). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Project Gutenberg eBook) Book I – Neither Principles Nor Ideas Are Innate (produced by Harris, S. & Widger, D.). Project Gutenberg.
Plato, Grube, G. M. A. (trans.) (1997). Meno. In Cooper, J. (ed.) Plato: Complete Works. Hackett. pp. 870-897.
Plato, Grube, G. M. A. (trans.) (1997). Phaedo. In Cooper, J. (ed.) Plato: Complete Works. Hackett. pp. 49-100.
Samet, J. (2019). The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness (Summer 2019 Edition). In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University: Metaphysics Research Lab.