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User:LGreg/sandbox/Approaches to Knowledge (LG seminar 2020/21)/Seminar 18/Truth/Truth in history

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Truth in history edit

The perceived actuality of truth used in the academic discipline of history has changed over time, depending upon the social and intellectual climate. Conflicts have also arisen amongst historians regarding the nature of historical knowledge.

History of truth in history edit

During the Age of Enlightenment, when the natural sciences and empiricism were revered, the consensus amongst historians was that absolute, objective truth could be obtained in history, so long as all the facts were studied.[1] Consequently, in an attempt to achieve this complete objectivity, a positivist approach was used, whereby history was understood purely by collating primary sources, which historians then critically evaluated to determine any biases (not too dissimilar to the scientific method), rather than through interpreting historical events and developing judgements.[2][1][3] Such a method of determining historical truth through the means of systematic analysis was propagated by prominent figures such as Voltaire, and the historians belonging to the twentieth century Annales school, first developed in France.[4][2] Due to this emphasis on the perceived scientific nature of history and its universality, it was believed that it could be conclusive and beyond the possibility of doubt.[3]

However, this paradigm of historical thought shifted following the onset of the First World War in 1914.[3] It is now widely believed by many historians, including Phillips, that history can never achieve the same standard of complete objectivity as the natural sciences, given that its evidence is all rooted in the past and cannot be reproduced through the means of testing.[1] Whilst empirical data may be collected, the manner in which it is categorised is dependent upon the historian.[5] Whilst there are certain fixed entities, such as dates and the existence of key actors in the past - a posteriori knowledge - objectivity in history is limited to this, and cannot extend to more conceptual events (such as the creation of a discipline for example), which require historians to collate a range of sources before they are able to put forward an interpretation.[6] Indeed, it is this interpretative work that attempts to understand past events and 'create meaning' that is now regarded a crucial constituent of history as a discipline.[1] Thus, truth in history is principally subjective. This is emphasised by the idea that historians must choose which facts are to be presented (as it is seemingly unfeasible to study all of them), and the contention that a historian's final judgement is influenced by their personal understanding and definition of certain complex notions.[5]

Stemming from this apparent subjectivity, truth in history is now further thought to be perspectivist, as contended by Raymond Aron.[5] That is to say, truth is not universal, but rather contingent upon two main factors: the historian's milieu at the time of writing, and their personal views (and biases).[5] Indeed, even an individual's truths may later evolve over the passage of time.[5] Moreover, within perspectivism, another conceptual approach in history is historical understanding - or verstehen - developed by thinkers such as Dilthey, and Weber.[5][7] Verstehen, an anti-positivist approach, links truth with the socially constructed meanings held by members of a particular culture at a particular time.[5] As truths can hence vary amongst historians, William Dray suggests that a plurality of views may be used - something he terms 'inter-perspectivism'.[8]

Rethinking truth in history edit

It has been contended by Phillips and Dray that this 'inter-perspectivism' contributes to a form of historical objectivity - distinct to that prevalent in the natural sciences.[1][8] Whilst interpretations may differ, a Weltanschauung may still arise if there is one hegemonic school of thought.[1] This corresponds with Allan Megill's notion of 'disciplinary objectivity' which he defines as, 'the claim by practitioners of a particular discipline (sub-discipline, research field, etc) to have authoritative jurisdiction over its area of competence.' as cited by Marek Tamm, which relates to pragmatic theories of truth.[9]

A method of achieving such disciplinarily-specific truth in history is highlighted in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory, which takes an intersubjective approach.[5] Merleau-Ponty does not regard Aron's understanding of the discipline (as perspectivist and subjective) as entirely conflicting with objectivity.[5] Instead, he notes that, by recognising different historians' biases and scrutinising them in accordance with the context in which they each write, a comprehensive genuine conclusion may be reached regarding a historical matter.[5]

How truth is determined: source criticism edit

In order to analyse each source and determine its extent of truth, the historical method is followed.[10] Historians study a source's provenance and content to discern its likelihood of providing a bias, and use them to evaluate the source's overall reliability, credibility, and validity.[10]

References edit

  1. ↑ a b c d e f Phillips M. Absolute objectivity the ideal; perspectivism the reality. Kleio [Internet]. 1996 [Accessed 31 October 2020];28(1):32-42. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00232089685310041
  2. ↑ a b Salkind N. Positivism. Encyclopedia of Research Design [Internet]. 2010 [Accessed 31 October 2020];1-10. Available from: https://methods.sagepub.com/reference/encyc-of-research-design/n321.xml
  3. ↑ a b c Zeleza T. THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE FOR SCHOOLS. Transafrican Journal of History [Internet]. 1990 [Accessed 31 October 2020];19:1-23. Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328672?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents
  4. ↑ Shank J. Voltaire (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) [Internet]. Plato.stanford.edu. 2020 [Accessed 31 October 2020]. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voltaire/
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Whiteside K. Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron. History and Theory [Internet]. 1986 [Accessed 1 November 2020];25(2):132. Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2505302?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
  6. ↑ Little D. Philosophy of History [Internet]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition). 2017 [Accessed 1 November 2020]. Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/history/
  7. ↑ Bevir M. Historical Understanding and the Human Sciences. Journal of the Philosophy of History [Internet]. 2007 [Accessed 1 November 2020] ;1(3):259-270. Available from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/24g4s98c#main
  8. ↑ a b Sweet W. The Philosophy of History: A Re-Examination. New York: Ashgate; 2004.
  9. ↑ Tamm M. Truth, Objectivity and Evidence in History Writing. Journal of the Philosophy of History [Internet]. 2014 [Accessed 1 November 2020];8(2):265-290. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273598523_Truth_Objectivity_and_Evidence_in_History_Writing
  10. ↑ a b Garraghan G. A Guide to Historical Method. New York: Fordham University Press; 1946.
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