User:ClareParlett/sandbox/Approaches to Knowledge/Seminar Group 11/Truth

This is for UCL BASc Approaches to Knowledge (https://www.ucl.ac.uk/basc/current/core/atk) Seminar Group 11.

Truth and the Disciplines

Introduction

The New Oxford Dictionary of English distinguishes the definitions of ‘truth’ and ‘the truth,' implying thus that there could be a universal truth. “Truth” is defined as “the quality or state of being true” and “the truth” is defined as “that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality”. Ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322 BC) used the word “aletheia” in order to describe the absolute truth, which, etymologically in composed of the prefix “a-“ that stands for “not” and “lethe” meaning “forgetfulness, oblivion, concealment”.However, defining the notion of truth has been an issue across disciplines due to different possible understandings and interpretations of the given definition. Indeed, the notions of “reality” and “fact” are subject, most of the time, to empirical experiences that may not be accurate as they are guided by our senses. This approach was emphasised by French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650) who wrote in the Meditations on the First Philosophy, “What can be called in doubt”, where he explained that the senses are deceiving to the truth as they can distort facts; thus they cannot be trusted. Descartes carries on by methodologically doubting every knowledge or “truth” he previously had, in order to be certain about the bases of knowledge he lays. Descartes comes to realise that only Mathematics can be trusted to be true, as the subject does not need senses to exist : whether you are awake or dreaming, 2 + 2 = 4 always. Although, Descartes doubts the truthfulness of empirical experiences in favour of Mathematical truth, the notion of truth varies in today’s time across disciplines; from subjective truths to objective truths, for example.

Truth in Art

Who determines art? Is it the artists? The public? The artistic institutions? How would institutions give an answer to the question, What is Art? This paragraph aims to answer this latter question. Institutions are the ones who install the public’s encounter with art, henceforth they have the power to influence society’s normalised definition of ‘art’. The reason they have this power is because the public trusts the value these institutions place on artefacts and so-called ‘art’. The public trust is founded upon the basis that the institutions are displaying ‘true art’. What do we mean by ‘true art’? Art that has a traceable and genuine history, whether that be the artist who created it, its time period, or the culture it originated from. Providing evidence of this context is what gives artefacts their value. For example, Gadwell recalls the purchasing of a Kouros statue by the Paul Getty Museum in California in 1982. {{{}}}} Preceding the purchase, the curators, along side geologists and scientists, investigated the statue’s history in order to determine its validity. The incentive for curating valid pieces comes from the public’s interest to view original and ‘real’ artefacts. However, the problem with this concept is that value is also subjective; context and validity are not the only intrinsic factors in discerning value in art. Value has proven to be a concept that changes with time and is dependent upon the individual or institution giving this subjective value. Dean explores this by discussing the effects of Western institutions introducing Eastern artefacts that were not originally created with intent of being aesthetically appreciated ‘art’. He argues that it, in fact, could be seen as a type of cultural appropriation, which would presume Dean’s opinion on the definition of true art being rooted in intent.

References [to be referenced]

By Heather and Ambre (collaboratively)

R. Owen and T Altenber, Truth in Cinema, 2011

This article explores the way truth is presented in fictional cinema and cites many interesting articles in which people have explored this topic with specific examples. It states as gospel that cinema has always been ‘in pursuit of the real’ and then goes on to focus on the impact of ‘cinematic truth claims’. This assertion is a bold one and calls into question the meaning of art itself. Can art always be seen ‘in pursuit of the real’, or is it less simple than that? Can, even the most fantastical piece of imagination be seen as a reflection of our worldly truth?

If cinema is always a ‘reflection of the collective unconscious at a certain place and time’ as the article claims was, film theorist, Bazin’s point of view, what is the impact of ‘cinematic truth claims’?

The presentation of Truth

The presentation of information as objective truth in various forms of media is immediately problematic due to the, of course, mediated nature of media. Media is not a direct access to the ‘ding-an-sich’ which is being signified, however this does not mean it is alien to the truth. To what extent can media overcome structural and contextual limitations to portray the truth, and when does the reproduction of truth become a fictitious representation of reality, or another reality in itself?

The audio-visual medium captures a historical event through a lens. Documentary film-maker Jill Godmilow (1) defines, “documentary”, as, “all the films that make some kind of claim to represent a real (not fictional) world”.  Owen and Altenber (2), similarly assert that fictional cinema has always been ‘in pursuit of the real’.Whilst both recognise the aspiration of presenting truth, they then go on to acknowledge the relative limitations of their field. Godmillow (1), for example, talks about the Polish government enabling her to shoot in Poland which meant not being able to capture the events, whilst Owen and Altenber refine their point by introducing the idea that cinema is instead a ‘reflection of the collective unconscious at a certain place and time’ and so, whilst it presents a sort of ‘truth’ this is focussed on the perception of the cinematographer.

Likewise, writer Rushdie (3) recognises that the world of journalism is often fragmented and inconsistent, and suggests that “the world can perhaps be best explained in terms of conflicting and often incompatible narratives.” Rushdie embraces the fact that we live a world where concrete, important truth exists alongside what some might label as fictitious information, and proposes that “truths of the great constant” can be obtained by distilling facts from “radical disagreement”.

McNeill (4) disorientates modernity’s view of history as a ‘Wissenschaft’ by drawing attention to the omission of information in the construction of histories and ultimately concluding objective historical truth is “an unattainable goal” (4). McNeill (4) demarcates between history and data. Data, although “undoubted and indubitable information” (4), is ultimately of limited use without second order conceptualisation, whereas history is information “put together into a pattern that is understandable and credible” (4), due to certain pieces of information being emphasised and others being omitted. Therefore the creation of history will always be myth to some and truth to others depending on their “different assumptions and organizing concepts about the world” (4). McNeill’s (4) argumentation has profound impacts on the possibility of accurate documentation, his logic can easily be applied to the media of documentaries and journalism to also attack their truth-value.

References

1. Jill Godmilow, in conversation with Ann‐Louise Shapiro. History and Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of History. Volume 36, Issue 4. How real is the reality in documentary filmmaking. 17 December 2002. Pp 80-101.  
2. R. Owen and T Altenber. Truth in Cinema. New Readings 11. 2011: 1-3
3. Salman Rushdie. Truth, Lies and Literature. The New Yorker. 2018. URL (https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/truth-lies-and-literature [23/10/18])
4. William H. McNeill, Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians, The American Historical Review, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), pp. 1-10

Written collaboratively (Malina, Jae, Sajjan, and Rosalind) with each person contributing from their specific article.

Rosalindchaston (discuss • contribs) 12:21, 10 October 2018 (UTC)

Are there universal truths? (Nora)

Truth in History: The teaching of WW2 in Japan

What does Japan teach about WW2?

What are the implications of this?

Why is this a problem for the world and interdisciplinarity?

https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/27/magazine/how-japan-teaches-its-own-history.html

This article is a good starting point and very interesting but lacks any solid quantitative evidence (gives evidence of them asking a group of students in a class but without any numbers).

Things to find out include: -How does Japan teach history (with quantitative data)? -Does the teaching of Japanese history match up to the reality (with qualitative data)? -Is there debate about the teaching of history in Japan? -How does this compare to the rest of the world (aka are others just as bad)?

Scientific vs. aesthetic truths

(by Tingjun and Georgie)

In order to discuss truth, it is necessary to comprehend what is understood by “knowledge”, since the definition of knowledge is the most fundamental aspect of epistemology (1). It is commonly understood that there are two forms of knowledge(2): scientific and aesthetic. Aesthetic knowledge, as defined by McLenachan, is ‘a more abstract and non-rational way of “knowing”’ and is ‘the subjective understanding of inner self’, whereas scientific knowledge is described as ‘an adding of objective knowledge of the outside world’ (3). However, only scientific knowledges can be tested and therefore validated logically (4), which makes it hard to compare scientific and aesthetic truths. Tarkovskii’s opinion may sound reasonable but will barely have a chance to be proved. Tarkovskii is thought to have prioritised aesthetic knowledge (5), however is it right for us to regard one type of knowledge as superior to the other? It could potentially be more useful to not categorise situations or problems by only applying one form of knowledge in their solutions, and instead to apply a cross-disciplinary approach to achieve a broader outlook. By addressing some questions with the converse form of knowledge, some academics believe we may be able to gain insight at an expedited rate, such as applying philosophical argument to issues that science has not yet confronted (6).

Similarly, truth is defined differently within these two disciplines. Truth in science should ‘... be directly proportional to the quantity and quality of evidence for the conclusion’ and that theory can have validation, under certain conditions (7). This is in contrast with the truth deduced within aesthetic discipline, as these truths are commonly understood to be non-existent (8) and instead the aesthetic misleads by implying there is truth within mimetic objects (9). Possibly aesthetic knowledge should be disregarded as it ‘does not provide true beliefs’ (10) and that it can only be a source of knowledge if ‘that knowledge reflected something essential to art’s nature and value’ (11). Opposingly, the experience we gain from aesthetic discipline can provide truths, and therefore perhaps we must reconsider the definitions and boundaries of knowledge and truth (12).

The potential validation of scientific truths renders the comparison between these truths and that which are drawn from aesthetic knowledge unachievable. Fundamentally, the argument becomes problematic when we try to define “knowledge”. What is or is not knowledge? Can knowledge simply be categorised within these two forms? If so, it is still unclear if categorisation aids us in achieving more concrete conclusions in the discovery of truth within disciplines.

References:

1. Thomas Mclenachan, Truth is Stranger than Science Fiction: The Quest for Knowledge in Andrei Tarkovskii’s Solaris and Stalker, Slovo, Autumn 2014: 29
2. Thomas Mclenachan, Truth is Stranger than Science Fiction: The Quest for Knowledge in Andrei Tarkovskii’s Solaris and Stalker, Slovo, Autumn 2014: 8
3. Thomas Mclenachan, Truth is Stranger than Science Fiction: The Quest for Knowledge in Andrei Tarkovskii’s Solaris and Stalker, Slovo, Autumn 2014: 8
4. Thomas Mclenachan, Truth is Stranger than Science Fiction: The Quest for Knowledge in Andrei Tarkovskii’s Solaris and Stalker, Slovo, Autumn 2014: 29
5. Thomas Mclenachan, Truth is Stranger than Science Fiction: The Quest for Knowledge in Andrei Tarkovskii’s Solaris and Stalker, Slovo, Autumn 2014: 8
6. Adam Frank, Are Scientific Truths Better Than Other Truths?, National Public Radio, 04 October 2016. Available from: https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2016/10/04/496506749/are-scientific-truths-better-than-other-truths?t=1540300628793&t=1540304920838
7. Kenell J. Touryan, David W. Hogg, John F. Wójcik and James S. Brush1, Science and “Truth”, Science, 30 July 1999. Available from: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/285/5428/663.2
8. Sarah E. Worth, Art and Epistomology, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://www.iep.utm.edu/art-ep/
9. Plato. and H.D.P. Lee, The Republic, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974: 595-601
10. Sarah E. Worth, Art and Epistomology, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://www.iep.utm.edu/art-ep/
11. Sarah E. Worth, Art and Epistomology, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://www.iep.utm.edu/art-ep/
12. Sarah E. Worth, Art and Epistomology, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: https://www.iep.utm.edu/art-ep/

Different perspectives on truth

The concept of truth is hard to define. It has been discussed in several disciplines and has created much debate among academics in their respective fields. It is interesting to analyse in greater detail the way in which truth may be viewed in the context of Anthropology, Law, Literature and the Social Sciences. In the article “Universality of truth” (1) the following question concerning the nature of truth arises. Is it possible for us to consider truth as a universal concept that crosses social, cultural, scientific and linguistic barriers or is it just a construct? The answer to this seemingly bold and generic question has been taken into consideration by the philosopher, sociologist and historian Michel Foucault. He states that “there is no such thing as one truth”, there are, on the other hand, different “faces of truth”, which differ according to the meaning, function and value in which they find themselves. In a broad sense, Foucault’s vision of truth is related to the way in which different societies perceive and interpret truth. For example, taking into consideration the society depicted by George Orwell in the dystopian novel “1984” (2), knowledge is depicted as a mean to control the population and shape its mentality. The author’s thesis is that truth has the power to control masses. Therefore, by changing past records and documents, the regime is able to control the present. The concept of Universal Truth is completely erased, as the regime continuosly contradicts itself and changes facts in order to shape society and control it. This way the concept of truth gets completely distorted resulting in a phenomena called doublethink, for which a person simultaneously accepts two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct. It is through a deep and global control of information that the regime is able to change and reorganise the information the population receives. This methodology and approach to the production of knowledge is deeply rooted in the Anthropological systemisation of information. Furthermore, an experiential use of truth may challenge our own values and beliefs and our criteria of judging it. This can be seen in the Juridical field. In the context of a trial, human error and subjectivity arise through personal experiences, memories and the emotions associates with these, thus, morphing the objective perception of truth. In Bernhard Schlink’s novel “The Reader” a philosophical investigation concerning the nature of freedom and responsibility, as well as the relation between law and emotion emerges. The main character Hanna is brought to trial, convicted of having been an active perpetrator in the Holocaust. In the novel, the narrator’s love for Hanna warped his objective approach towards what is right and what is wrong and how to distinguish innocence from guilt. “…I had to point at Hanna. But the finger I pointed at her turned back to me. I had loved her. I tried to tell myself that I had known nothing of what she had done when I chose her.” (2) The reliability of law in discerning between these seemingly two polar opposites is questioned. The main dilemma which arises in the context of law is whether there is such a clear distinction between truth and falsehood, or if maybe there is a broad spectrum of what can be viewed as truth in different contexts and from different perspectives. In the academic field of economics, the extent to which models can in fact be deemed as 'near-truth' has been heavily disputed. Referring to the Cambridge Dictionary, economic theory is depicted as "the ideas and principles that aim to describe how economies work"(4). From this definition stems the question of can we as economists truly describe and predict how our economic future will unfold? We base our expectations on economic theories and models, however there are no "constants"(5) in social phenomenon and anything could happen. 'Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling' discusses the extent to which economic models can be deemed "approximately true" and highlights that social theorising, alike other social sciences, "involves the imposition of a certain view of the world on the world" (6). One could suppose that theory is the closest that we will get to the truth in economics. It equips us with the tools to predict what will happen in the future based on what has happened in the past, however this is commonly conflicted by the fact that economists failed to detect the foreboding financial crisis of 2007-8. Furthermore, can we precisely define truth, as each discipline renders their own perspectives about what they deem to be true?

References

1. https://perspectivesinanthropology.wordpress.com/2015/05/01/universality-of-truth
2. George Orwell, "1984", 1949, Part 1, Chapter 7
3. B. Schlink, The Reader (Der Vorleser), 1995, p 47-48
4. (Definition of “economic theory” from the Cambridge Business English Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)
5. ECONOMIC Dictionary, Meaning of “economic theory” in the English Dictionary. Available from: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/economic-theory
6. The Truth About Economics, I: A Discipline in Crisis, First Published on the Wealthy Nation Institute Website, 2018. Available from: http://%20http://www.wealthynationinstitute.com/uploads/4/5/1/9/45197939/13.02.17_-_the_truth_about_economics_-_david_simpson_-_wni.pdf
7. Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling, by Geoffrey Brennan, Werner Güth and Hartmut Kliemt, November 30, 2004. Available from: http://ftp://194.94.206.15/esi/discussionpapers/2004-38.pdf

The introduction and the sections regarding truth in anthropology and law were written, references and edited collaboratively between Nora and Alessia. The section regarding truth in literature (e.g. 1984) was edited and referenced by Rebecca. The section regarding truth in economics was edited and referenced by Megan.

Objectivity in the Social Sciences

There exists concern of objectivity regarding science and aesthetic disciplines. I.C. Jarvie determines that ‘only the tautologies of logic and mathematics can be proved to be true’ (1) and that it is very difficult to obtain objectivity within disciplines concerning social sciences. In this case, we must determine that objectivity is not the same as certainty (2). To be objective, we must consider that something is not deemed to be true or false, but that it stands within a context of which has ‘fixed, objective properties’ (2). The concept of truth enables a dialogue between our thoughts and the world around us (2). That we can judge something to have legitimacy on any level renders us potentially incapable of objectivity, as we are predisposed to prior knowledge and experience. Bias has the capacity to intervene within scientific investigation, interpreted as ‘the pursuit of truth’ by Karl Popper’s theory (3). In this way, truth and objectivity could be considered as well associated.

Within the disciplines of sociology and anthropology, there is much conversation over the role and significance of objectivity, and how social scientists can obtain greater objectivity. Despite complete objectivity being commonly considered as a near impossibility, it is important to strive towards a more objective approach. This is to say that we must accept criticism and allow theories to develop under this scrutiny than to allow complete subjectivity to dictate boundaries around suggested concepts. Furthemore, subjectivity would result in ‘the exclusion of rational debate’, permitting ‘the denial of the thesis of the intellectual or rational unity of mankind’ and potentially ‘opens the door to irrationalism and elitism, whether social or racial’ (4). For these reasons, it is beneficial in qualitative methodology for the researcher to ‘reflect on the values and objectives he brings to his research and how these affect the research project’ (5), in order to address the inheritance of intellectual and cultural bias.

References:

1. I.C. Jarvie, On the Objectivity of Anthropology, Thinking about Society: Theory and Practice. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 93., Springer, Dordrecht, 1974: 144-151
2. Daniel Little, Univeristy of Michigan-Dearbon, “Evidence and Objectivity in the Social Sciences”, Understanding Society, 2011. Available from: http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/POSITIV6.htm
3. Stephen Thornton, “Karl Popper”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2018 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/
4. R. J. Seeger and R. S. Cohe, "Objectivity in the Social Sciences", Philosophical Foundations of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 11, 1974: 305-16. Available from: https://www.tau.ac.il/~agass/judith-papers/objectivity.pdf
5. Carl Ratner, “Subjectivity and Objectivity in Qualitative Medthodology”, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, vol. 3, no. 3, Art. 16, September 2002. Available from: http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/829/1800