Member states would either consult the Permanent Court of International Justice, use attribution, or request an investigation or enquiry by the Council.
In the aftermath of World War I, in the economic blockade of Germany had been effective, the economic weapon appeared most potent.
However, the League lacked military teeth that France had desired.
The USA, which had conjugated the idea of the League, was missing, and sank into isolation, which would have given the League's economic sanctions real weight.
This removed the appearance of a 'worldwide' organisation.
Its permanent members, except Japan, were distinctly European.
The smaller states that replace the Austro-Hungarian empire would require far more nurture than larger states that would be able to supply tangible support when required.
How successful was the League of Nations in the 1920s?
Aaland, 1920 was a success as the decisions made by the League were adopted by the Swedes and Finland.
Vilna, 1920–23 was a partial success as, though the Conference of Ambassadors awarded Vilna to Poland, the League was unable to prevent Poles from seizing and retaining it by force.
Upper Silesia, 1921 was a success as the League was able to divide Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland.
Corfu, 1932 was a failure as Mussolini blamed Greece initially, ordered compensation and occupied Cofru, and ignored orders to lay back by the League.
Mosul, 1924 was a success as the Leagues consideration of the claimed land by Turkey and Iraq to award the land to Iraq was accepted.
Following the Corfu Incident, Bulgaria, 1925 was a success as an investigation by the League blamed Greece for starting a dispute and ordered to pay damages, which was accepted.
P. M. H. Bell argues that though the League was not able to solve all disputes successfully, what was important was that the League offered a forum for the conduct of international affairs.
Bell goes on to say that once Germany was admitted in 1926, the League was no longer a 'League of victors'.
France began to feel as though the Treaty of Versailles was being undermined and so the France, who desperately required the reparation payments, sought to secure the payments with the Wiesbaden Accords in October 1921, whereby they took a proportion of raw materials from the Ruhr.
When payments had fallen into arrears, with support from Belgium and Italy, France sent troops to the Ruhr to take the materials owed by force.
The German government still had to pay its striking workers, and so printed more money, thereby causing hyperinflation.
The French retaliated the 'passive resistance' and in 1924, Gustav Stresemann called an end to it, and initiated the Dawes Plan.
The plan mortgaged its main railway and various German industries in order to receive a load from the US to pay France.
Repayments were reduced.
Though it was not in France's best interest, it accepted as it brought the US into the picture; and this age became the 'golden age of reparations'.
This is an example of a failure of the League, as France had acted on its own initiative and interest, forcing payments and undermining the League's credibility.
France had alarmed its allies, and heightened the sense of patriotism within Germany.
'Stresemann wanted to rid Germany of the 'occupying forces' in the Rhineland dictated by the Treaty of Versailles; he did so by proposed a voluntary German guarantee of its western borders.
This resolved claims over Alsace-Lorraine and reassured France would not be invaded again.
Germany signed treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland to guarantee its eastern borders by arbitration.
The Locarno Pact seemed to bod well for the future of collective security, and the new mood was dubbed "the Locarno spirit".
Italy was unable to get similar guarantees over its southern border.
France had changed its strategy for containing Germany.
Locarno had undermined both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations.
Further reduced the total sum to be repaid by Germany.
Set a date for completion of repayments, 1988.
Continued US involvement in reparation payments.
John Maynard Keynes noted in 1926 that the foundations of both the Dawes and Young Plan was foreign money recovering European countries; "in the hands of American capitalists."
The worldwide economic depression followed the Wall Street Crash in October 1929.
The USA had become a globally dominant power, and thus the world was ominously linked to its fortunes.
The impact of the crash had economic, social and ultimately political consequences, that returned the world's nations to self-interest dominated states.
The stability in Europe nurtured by capitalist American resources had collapsed.
Poverty and despair was abundant, governments became fragile and extreme political groups emerged.
The depression heightened fears of the USSR's communist revolution into impoverished working class European cities.
The League's weapon of economic sanctions was now useless as nations would now only want to protect their own interest.
Alliances and secret agreements outside of the League reemerged; old-style diplomacy was back.
Japan, Asia's greatest industrial and trading power, was greatly affected by the world depression.
The USA was attempting to increase its influence in the Pacific, and would be concerned with any 'aggressive' expansionism there.
In September 1931, the Kwantung Army claimed a bomb explosion near the town of Mukdem, a Chinese province, was evidence of growing disorder. Japan invaded.
China appealed to the League, and this incident was exactly the type that 'collective security' was to contain.
The League condemned Japan's actions and ordered a withdrawal of Japanese troops. The Japanese government agreed, however, its army refused (This exposed Japan's control over its military).
The League commission took more than a year to report, by which time the invasion and occupation was complete.
The League asked Japan to return the land to China, and in response, Japan left the League, and claimed that the condemnation of their actions in China was hypocrisy by powers such as Britain, which had a long legacy of using force to achieve its objectives in China.
Why did the League fail to resolve the Manchurian Crisis?
China had appealed to the League for help in the face of an aggressor, however, they received no support, neither militarily or economically (sanctions on Japan).
Richard Overy points out that by leaving the League, Japan had 'effectively removed the Fear East from the system of collective security'.
What was the impact of the Manchurian Crisis on the growth of Japanese militarism?
Mussolini had a long-term ambition of securing a North-African empire, but also needed to distract his people from the impact of the Depression.
Conquering Abyssinia would link two Italian African territories, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.
A full scale invasion occurred on October 1935, and Mussolini thought that the League would not respond and that Britain and France would protest.
Italy's invasion was condemned and the League decided to employ an escalating program of sanctions.
In fear of losing Italy to Nazi Germany, French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval and British Foreign Minister Samueal Hoare secretly rekindled a plan, known as the Hoare-Laval Pact, to allow Italy to control trwo-thirds of Abyssinia.
The pro-League British public heard news of the pact and both Hoare lost his job.
The League's sanctions were so diluted that they had little impact on the Italian war effort, and no embargo on oil was place.
Britain refused to close the Suez Canal to Italian shipping.
What were the effects of the Abyssinian Crisis on the League of Nations?
The crisis had revealed (much like the Manchurian Crisis) that the League's powers were not prepared to stand up to other major members if their interests were not threatened.
Italy was isolated from its former allies, and moved closer to Nazi Germany.
The League's ultimate weakness was ready for Hitler to exploit.
The League could not longer exert any authority.
The Abyssinian Crisis was the 'final nail in the coffin' for the League, it was simply symbolic of an idea that had failed.
The idea was clearly incompatible with the old-style militaristic alliances and modern expansionist ideologies.
Upon the preparations of this conference, disagreements still occurred regarding the armament limitations.
If the League members failed to bring about a substantial disarmament, Germany would demand the right to rearm.
Germany demanded 'equality of status', but this aspiration clashed with French security; if Germany was equal, France would not be secure, and if France was secure, Germany could not be equal.
The economic instablity of the 1930s following the Depression caused nations to concentrate on their own problems first rather than work for collective security.
Some countries used rearmament as a way of providing employment and thus helping their economies.
The new communist regime in Russia, the fragility of new states in Central Europe, and a discontented Germany made many states reluctant to limit their arms.
Japan's invasion of Manchuria undermined the idea of collective security and meant that nations with interests in Asia-Pacific region were unlikely to welcome disarmament suggestions.